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Why We Are All Jurisprudes (or, at
Least, Should Be)
Michelle Madden Dempsey
Introduction
What follows is a lightly revised speech I presented at a symposium on
The Future of Legal Scholarship in April 2016 at Northeastern University School
of Law. It presents a brief overview of the questions that have traditionally
occupied the ﬁeld of jurisprudence, ﬂags up a growing movement within the
ﬁeld to eliminate these questions, and defends the view that getting the right
answers to these questions remains an important project.1
We’ve gathered today to address the future of legal scholarship. Given the
“new normal” in the legal academy, with restricted (or eliminated) resources
dedicated to supporting scholarship, many areas of legal scholarship are
under threat. The value of legal scholarship in general is being attacked both
within and outside the academy, and perhaps no area of legal scholarship is
more derided than jurisprudence. Most critics will agree that at least some kinds
of legal scholarship may still be of value. Empirical legal scholarship, they
may concede, can tell us something useful and true about the world in which
we live, while doctrinal scholarship can potentially be of service to judges in
interpreting and applying the law, to litigators in arguing what the law is or
should be, and to legislators in creating new law, etc. But jurisprudence? In
the “new normal” of the legal academy, jurisprudence is increasingly regarded
as an indulgent waste of time.2
Michelle Madden Dempsey is an Associate Dean of Faculty Research & Development and a
Professor of Law at Villanova University School of Law. The author thanks Robin West, Kate
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1.

By way of clariﬁcation, the term “jurisprudes” in my title is meant simply to refer to legal
scholars who engage legal philosophy (jurisprudence).

2.

See, e.g., Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts, Jr., Interview at Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals Annual Conference, available at www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/
conversation-chief-justice-roberts at approx. 30:40 (June 25, 2011) (“Pick up a copy of
any law review that you see and the ﬁrst article is likely to be, you know, the inﬂuence of
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which
I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the
bar.”). Roberts’s comment was widely regarded as disdainful of legal scholarship such
as jurisprudence. For an amusing response, see Orin Kerr, The Inﬂuence of Immanuel Kant on
Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251, available at http://online.
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/kantbulgaria_kerr.pdf

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 66, Number 1 (Autumn 2016)

30

Journal of Legal Education

In this atmosphere, it is tempting to be pessimistic about the future of
jurisprudence. Perhaps the skeptics are right and jurisprudence is a waste
of time—time better spent focusing on empirical or doctrinal scholarship
or, better yet, teaching our students to be “practice ready” at graduation.3
However, I think the skeptics are wrong—and the time is ripe to be optimistic
about the future of jurisprudence. Indeed, I think the future of jurisprudence
can and should be defended not only from nonjurisprude critics, but from the
internal critique it faces from the relatively new “eliminativism” trend within
jurisprudence.
Before I go any further, two points deserve attention. First, I should confess
that I don’t consider jurisprudence to be my main focus of scholarship. While
my doctoral studies and much of my scholarship is informed by analytic legal
philosophical methods, most of my work tends to focus on the philosophy of
criminal law.4 Second, as you might expect of an analytic legal philosopher,
I think we should start by getting very clear about what, precisely, we mean by
jurisprudence. Literally, jurisprudence means (from the Latin), “wisdom about
the law”—but I take it that I’ve been asked to address the philosophical study
of law. Understood as such, the topic of jurisprudence can be carved up in
diﬀerent ways. One helpful way is to subdivide it into general and particular
jurisprudence—with general jurisprudence referring to a topic that concerns
philosophical puzzles presented by all legal systems (e.g., What counts as valid
law? What is the normative force of valid law?), and particular jurisprudence
referring to philosophical puzzles that pop up in a given jurisdiction (e.g.,
What state actions violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause?
What is the nature of judicial interpretation in a common law jurisdiction?), or
within particular doctrinal categories (e.g., Is tort concerned with civil wrongs
or the allocation of risk? What is the diﬀerence between torts and crimes?).
I take it that the topic I’ve been asked to address today concerns general
jurisprudence. One way to think about the topic of general jurisprudence is
to divide it up into diﬀerent camps—or, as Ronald Dworkin memorably put it,
competing “doctrinal armies.”5 Each army comes with its historic commander—
3.

By “doctrinal scholarship” I mean scholarship that seeks to answer relatively narrow
questions regarding which legal rules apply in a particular area of law in one or more
jurisdictions (e.g., “Is necessity a defense to homicide in English law?” “Is sex without
consent suﬃcient to establish the actus reus of rape in most U.S. states?”)—as distinct from
jurisprudence which (as discussed below) tends to focus on more general questions (“What
is law?” “What is the normative force of law?” “How does precedent constrain judicial
decision-making?”). Of course, Ronald Dworkin’s inﬂuence in shaping questions of general
jurisprudence has tended to blur the lines between doctrinal scholarship and jurisprudence.
See, especially, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).

4.

All of this is simply to say that I don’t view myself as having any stake in ongoing debates
in the ﬁeld of jurisprudence—although, as will become clear, I do have some philosophical
commitments regarding jurisprudential issues that will inform my reﬂections.

5.

Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 37 (2004), urging “young scholars who have not yet joined a doctrinal army” to
endorse his interpretivist methodological commitments. Note that Dworkin’s use of the
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the intellectual leader of that jurisprudential army, who contributed most
to framing the questions and providing answers that concern general
jurisprudence. And so, on this view, we have H.L.A. Hart as the commander
of the legal positivist army6—with later variations of legal positivism giving
rise to Joseph Raz’s exclusive legal positivist camp7—and Wil Waluchow,
Jules Coleman and others in the inclusive legal positivist camp.8 On the
other side we have Commander Ronald Dworkin and his forces in the antipositivist doctrinal army.9 And somewhere closer to legal positivism, albeit
uncomfortably so, we have Commander John Finnis and the New Natural
Law general jurisprudential forces.10
Primarily, general jurisprudence has been concerned with getting clear
(perhaps obsessively so) about what it means to characterize something as legal
and explaining what legal validity entails in terms of its normative force. Yet, in
one of the more intriguing recent contributions to general jurisprudence, Scott
Hershovitz urges us to embrace what he calls “The End of Jurisprudence”—by
which he means both that we should put an end to this obsessive concern with
clarity regarding what is legal and what is not, and that we should adopt a new
“end” (goal) for jurisprudence—one that focuses more explicitly on “the moral
consequences of our legal practices.”11 Later, I’ll push back on Hershovitz
and explain why I think the future of jurisprudence should continue to be
concerned with getting clear about what is legal, precisely because of the moral
consequences of our legal practices. First, however, I want to explain the sense
in which we (meaning, we legal academics) are all jurisprudes (or, at least, why
we should be)—and why we shouldn’t be only jurisprudes.
We Are All Jurisprudes (or, at Least, We Should Be)
If the way I’ve set up the topic of jurisprudence is plausible, then, to some
extent, at least, we are all jurisprudes. We might not be writing articles, chapters
or books on topics such as, “What is law?” “What is a legal system?” “What
is legal reasoning?” “What is the normative force of law?” etc.—but certainly
all law professors must have some background sense of what their answers to
phrase “doctrinal army” here is more akin to what I would characterize as “jurisprudential
army.” See supra note 3, observing that Dworkin’s scholarship tended to blur the lines
between doctrine and jurisprudence.
6.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Leslie Green, ed., 3d ed. 2012).

7.

JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2009).

8.

WIL WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994); Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive
Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).

9.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); DWORKIN, supra note 3.

10.

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011). On Finnis’s discomfort
regarding the similarities between his account of the nature of law and the legal positivist’s
account, see Michelle Madden Dempsey, On Finnis’s Way In, 57 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2012); John
Finnis, Response, 57 VILL. L. REV. 925 (2012).

11.

Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L. J. 1160, 1204 (2015).
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these questions would be. This background sense then informs our teaching
and scholarship. To the extent that we can be self-aware of our answers to
these questions, and consistent in our philosophical commitments as we teach
any particular area of law, all the better. We don’t need to jump into the deep
end of the Hart-Dworkin debates to get our 1L torts class through the basics
of Palsgraf, or contemplate whether Finnis’s account of basic human goods
is adequate in order to teach the diﬀerence between duress and necessity in
criminal law. Of course, we might choose do that in our teaching (at our
own risk of negative student evaluations), but we don’t have to engage these
jurisprudential questions explicitly. What we do need, however—and what I
imagine all of us have—is some more or less worked-out understanding of what
we think we’re teaching when we teach law. And if something is a law, then
we have some underlying explanation regarding whether we think that fact
should mean anything for the people to whom it is addressed (e.g., Should
people obey that thing that is a law?). So, in that sense, we’re all jurisprudes—
or, at least, we should be.
But even more important, we shouldn’t just be jurisprudes—at least not in
the sense of being exclusively focused on the questions that have traditionally
concerned general jurisprudence. Rather, as Robin West has compellingly
argued, we (the legal academy) should take up a new kind of jurisprudence—
one that has been missing from the American scholarly landscape.12 This
“progressive natural law jurisprudence,” as she calls it, would focus on areas
that have been neglected in the traditional general jurisprudence literature:
“What does it mean for human beings to ﬂourish, and how can law and
legalism contribute? . . . When and where is law needed? What makes a good
law good . . . and what makes it ineﬃcacious or worse?”13
In substance, I agree with West that we should focus far more than we do on
questions regarding what makes for good (or bad) laws, and that our answers
to those questions should be informed by a robust, progressive account of
basic human goods. My only quibble is whether we should label this project
under the heading of “jurisprudence” (as she does), or whether the project
is better understood simply as a matter of “law reform.” If we stick with my
limited account of general jurisprudence as a branch of philosophy that is
concerned with questions such as “What is law?” “What is the normative force
of law?” etc., then I would think that West’s project falls outside the ambit of
jurisprudence. So while I endorse the project in substance, I prefer to think of
it as an advisable add-on to jurisprudence, not an alternative or replacement.
Perhaps it doesn’t matter whether we call it “jurisprudence” or “law
reform.” Indeed, perhaps my desire for a tidy demarcation between the two
is symptomatic of the arguably obsessive search for clarity that can make
jurisprudes so annoying. As Jeremy Waldron puts it,
12.

ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2011).

13.

Id. at 11.
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[Jurisprudes] often comport themselves like the inhabitants of a small Paciﬁc
island . . . threatened by something like global warming: the waters of sloppy
thinking are rising all around them and they must huddle closer and closer
together on the vanishingly small piece of high ground that they currently
occupy.14

While I take Waldron’s point, I do still think it’s important to distinguish
jurisprudence from law reform, if only because the projects undertaken by the
jurisprude are essential to the work of the law reformer. Jurisprudence (most
importantly) provides an account of what law is. Without some understanding
of what law is, how can the law reformer undertake to reform it? The law
reformer with a confused understanding of law—one that sloppily conﬂates
legal norms with nonlegal social or political norms—would be an ineﬀective
law reformer, indeed. Simply put, what counts as law matters—especially if
you’re trying to reform it.
The End of Jurisprudence?
Of course, not everyone agrees that what counts as law matters all that much.
As I noted earlier, Hershovitz has recently urged jurisprudes to embrace “the
end of jurisprudence,” and thus put aside our traditional concern with getting
clear about how we characterize what is legal and what is not.15 On Hershovitz’s
eliminativist account, he doesn’t “see why we should feel pressure” to get very
clear about how we “characterize the legal domain.”16 Indeed, he thinks it’s
a mistake to think of legal normativity as distinct from moral normativity—
and he holds this view even in the face of morally bad laws.17 Tracking closely
onto Mark Greenberg’s view, neither Hershovitz nor Greenberg is terribly
concerned to distinguish the legal from the nonlegal, because, they suppose,

14.

Jeremy Waldron, Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
375 (Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds. 2004).

15.

Hershovitz, supra note 11.

16.

Id. at 1202. Hershovitz characterizes his view as an “eliminativist” approach to jurisprudence
because it eliminates the need to answer the central questions that frame the Hart-Dworkin
debate—namely, what is law and what, if any, normative force does law have—by denying the
existence of “a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity—that more
traditional pictures presuppose.” Id. at 1193.

17.

Id. at 1193. Hershovitz puts the point in terms of positing a distinctively legal domain (“[I]t
seemed that we had to posit a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity,
to make sense of the way that we talk about law. But that’s a mistake.”). I reformulated
the point in my recounting of Hershovitz’s because I take him to mean something like,
“[I]t seemed that we had to [(think in terms of) or (assume the existence of)] a distinctively
legal domain of normativity.” I don’t take him to be making any claims regarding whether
it seemed that we had to “posit” such a domain—since that claim would raise a quite distinct
question of whether it seemed we should have a distinctively legal domain, not whether we
should think in terms of or assume the existence of such a domain.

OF
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“the question of what obligations we classify as legal has no bearing ‘on what
we take our genuine obligations to be.’”18
Like many other jurisprudes, I agree that the question of what obligations we
classify as legal should have no bearing on what we take our genuine obligations
to be. Which is to say, I agree that the law is “normatively inert”—the fact
that some directive is a legal directive doesn’t mean that we should obey it.19
Indeed, it could just as easily mean that we should criticize it and reform it.
The fact that something counts as law doesn’t tell us anything about what
sort of practical attitude to adopt toward it in terms of obedience, critique, or
reform.
I’m less inclined than Hershovitz to want to eliminate questions of what
counts as legal and what does not, and the related question of which laws
(if any) bear normative force—since, in practice, the distinction between what
is legal and what is not legal does have great bearing on the perceptions and
actions of many people who take themselves to be bound by the law. The
real world is not ﬁlled with jurisprudes who recognize that the law has no
genuinely moral normative force. Rather, it’s ﬁlled with people who very often
perceive themselves to have a general moral obligation to obey the law. For
them, the question of what obligations count as legal obligations has tremendous
bearing on what they take their genuine moral obligations to be.
For this reason, if none other, we should continue the project of general
jurisprudence—and defend it from its critics, both external and internal. We
should still be concerned with getting very clear about what is legal and what
is not—and not kid ourselves into thinking that the distinction doesn’t matter.
It matters not because there is any genuinely moral normative force to law;
it matters because folks out there often mistakenly think there is such moral
normative force.
The Importance of Jurisprudence in the Age of Trump
The importance of what counts as law was driven home to me recently
listening to John Hockenberry’s National Public Radio broadcast The
Takeaway.20 Mike Breen, CEO of Truman National Security Project and a
former Army oﬃcer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, oﬀered the following
observations regarding Donald Trump’s potential presidency: “If you take the
man at his word and you listen to his statements on the [campaign] trail, he
set himself up, if he’s elected, to trigger the largest civil military crisis probably
since the American Civil War.”21
18.

Id. at 1201, citing Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1323-24 n.73
(2014).

19.

John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 202-04, 210, 213 (2001).

20.

Veteran: Trump Will Throw the Military into ‘Crisis,’ THE TAKEAWAY (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 28,
2016).

21.

Id.
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The discussion recounted orders that Trump has suggested he would direct
U.S. soldiers to carry out, which Breen characterized as “illegal orders”—
for example, targeting the children and families of suspected terrorists,
intentionally murdering civilians, and torturing just for the sake of torturing.
(“[Trump] says even if [torture] doesn’t work, let’s do it anyway.”22) Moreover,
as Breen recounts, Trump has said “the Geneva Convention makes American
soldiers afraid to ﬁght”23: “He’s talking about, as a presidential candidate,
issuing clearly illegal orders that I think our senior military leaders would be
very unlikely to follow.”24
Note the phrasing—“clearly illegal orders that I think our senior military
leaders would be very unlikely to follow.” Hockenberry pushed back—pointing
out the obvious fact that a morally evil legal order is, nonetheless, a legal order.
Now, if Breen had been an exclusive legal positivist (as is my predilection),
he could have taken Hockenberry’s point on board and simply replied
(hypothetically) as follows:
Sure, a Commander in Chief’s order is a legal order—but even so, that doesn’t
mean soldiers should kill innocent civilians! John, John, John . . . silly
John. . . . Legal obligation is not a species of moral obligation. Rather, legal
obligation is a distinct normative domain. Perhaps you’ve been reading too
much Hershovitz?

Now, perhaps role morality gives members of the military good reasons to be
cautious about rejecting the idea that legal obligation is a species of moral
obligation. Perhaps some roles in society enjoin people to be inclined to treat
law as if it bears genuine moral normativity. Perhaps. But then, that all depends
on whether we can reasonably assume that the law is going to be good—or at
least neutral—or, at the very least, only a little evil. If the law is really, deeply,
horriﬁcally evil, then we might just want everyone to recognize the truth that
legal obligation is a distinct domain from moral obligation.
In any event, that is the kind of discussion Breen and Hockenberry might
have had—but, instead, the conversation quickly devolved and they started
talking past one another. Breen began using a concept of law that implicitly
included moral criteria as a condition of legal validity, and Hockenberry
doubled down on a concept of law that oddly combined both legal positivism
and the assumption that valid laws ought to be obeyed. 25
22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

I’m oversimplifying somewhat. Breen did refer to legal doctrine that might ground
arguments against the legality of Trump’s potential orders. That said, each consideration
Breen raised is itself subject to the Rule of Change. HART, supra note 6, 76-77. As such, there
is nothing to prevent Trump’s orders from being recognized as valid legal orders.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, we are all and should be jurisprudes—perhaps not explicitly
so in our scholarship—but certainly implicitly so, in both our teaching and
our citizenship. Moreover, at least some of us should be law reformers.
And, crucially, none of us should seek to eliminate the questions that make
jurisprudence and law reform intelligible.
The future of jurisprudence should continue both to clarify the conceptual
criteria of what counts as law and to emphasize that legal obligations are not
a species of moral obligation. For, if we do face an evil legal system that posits
evil laws and evil legal orders, we should be steadfast in recognizing that legal
validity does not entail the moral obligation to obey—and we should remain
clear-eyed in identifying which laws need reform in order to eliminate the evil.
I will end with a quote from H.L.A. Hart—ﬁrst published in the aftermath
of a horriﬁcally evil, yet tragically legal, atrocity:
What surely is most needed in order to make [people] clear-sighted in
confronting the oﬃcial abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense
that the certiﬁcation of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the
question of obedience. . . . A concept of law which allows the invalidity of law
to be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity and
variety of these [two] separate issues. . . . So long as human beings can gain
suﬃcient cooperation from some to enable them to dominate others, they will
use the forms of law as one of their instruments.26

And so, let us all be, and remain, jurisprudes—and never forget that what the
law demands we do, morality may demand we resist.

26.

Hart, supra note 6, 210-211.

